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Abstract 
The aim of this review is to study technologies involved in a video 
conference through Internet. Some security issues and solutions 
to them are also covered in this report. 
 
At first, several video conference environments are presented to 
clarify concepts. Also some commercial solutions are mentioned. 
 
Secondly, signalling protocols, specially SIP, are studied to be 
used in the set up of a video conference. Possibilities to secure 
SIP are also covered in the theoretical study. 
 
Thirdly, the Secure RTP protocol is presented to be used to 
protect the media flows. Then a key agreement mechanism, 
MIKEY, is stated to make the key agreement needed to establish 
a crypto session for SRTP. 
 
After the background study, an implementation of a secure video 
conferencing platform using miniSIP and RTP Packet Reflector is 
proposed. 
 
Then, the final implementation is detailed, showing up the 
problems appeared during this process and possible solutions to 
them. Possible new features for the system are also proposed. 
 
Finally, some measurement results taken using the new software 
are presented and analyzed. 
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1. Introduction 
In a global situation, where companies and institutions operate all over the 
world and Internet is present in almost all countries, video conferencing is 
becoming an essential tool to communicate people in very far locations. It is a 
clear example of how technology can be applied to solve real needs of the 
society. 
 
Nowadays, video conferencing can be used in business meetings, telemedicine 
or medical councils and even in distant education. To all these reasons can be 
added that, since video conferences suppress the need to travel in order to 
have a meeting, it also contributes to environmental preservation-care. 
 
In order to increase the feeling of the participants in a video conference to be in 
the same room, new media technologies can be used. High Definition video 
technologies can improve the user experience, since details can be noticed. 
 
The quick development underwent by Internet technologies in last years 
increased the bandwidth available for user applications. This fact, linked with 
the growth of the SIP protocol and the H.323 specifications in the VoIP 
environment, has allowed the manufacturers to build simple-to-use video 
conference solutions. 
 
Finally, the use of Internet to transmit the media of a video conference shows 
some security issues to be solved. Doctors and businessman of any corporation 
probably would like to be sure only authorized people can watch and listen the 
conference, so some security measures must be implemented to protect this 
information. 
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2. Background 
This section presents a theoretical study about technologies and products 
involved in secure High Definition video conferencing. 
 
Firstly, current solutions in video conferencing are analyzed. It is also presented 
the concept of a centralized solution for multi point conferences. 
 
After that, signalling protocols to control media sessions and media issues 
(basically video coders) are studied. 
 
Finally, security solutions for media and signalling are discussed, making 
several proposals to provide different security levels to video conferences. 
 
2.1. Video conferencing 
A video conference is usually defined as a meeting of three or more people 
placed in different locations using any technology that enables them to see and 
to hear each other almost as if they were in the same room. 
 
The difference between a video conference and a video call is the number of 
participants in the meeting: two people would be considered just a video call 
(mainly because it can be done as a peer-to-peer call), whereas three or more 
people would be considered as a video conference. 
 
A video conference could also include file sharing, white board sharing and 
instant messages, which helps to have the feeling of being in a real meeting. 
 
Thanks to all these functionalities, video conferencing is a very valuable tool for 
telemedicine, distance education and business, because it allows to 
communicate people at different and very far locations without the need to 
travel. 
 
2.1.1. History 
The first approach for a video conference was made using two different UHF 
radio channels to send the signal obtained from television cameras. This 
system was used in the first space flights by the NASA and some television 
channels in the 60s and the 70s [1]. 
 
Few years after, television channels moved to mobile links to satellites using 
special trucks for their live connections outdoors. This was a very expensive 
technology, so it was not common in uses such as education, medicine or 
business. 
 
For that reason, during the 70s, the American operator AT&T developed the 
Picturephone, which was a telephone able to send low quality video and a 
telephone audio channel in a 6Mbps bit rate. Unfortunately, the equipments and 
the line costs were very high so the system did not succeed [1]. 
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In the 80s, Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) links deployed a digital 
telephony network, so operators started selling few models of videophones. 
Those devices were used to compress the video and the audio and to transfer 
that data to another videophone through the digital telephony line [1]. 
 
It was in the 90s, with the Internet Protocol (IP) networks deployment and the 
appearance of new standard based technologies when video calls or video 
conferencing became popular. Low quality video and audio channels were used 
as part of most the instant messaging platforms. Also, dedicated and expensive 
devices were made for big companies, in order to allow their people to meet 
with no time loose and avoiding travelling costs. 
 
Nowadays, video conferencing is used very often in big corporations, 
telemedicine and some educational environments. The research efforts in that 
area are focused on the use of High Definition (HD) video or high quality media, 
offering secure solutions and the combination of both. 
 
2.1.2. Videoconferencing architectures 
Depending on the way the media flows are treated and sent, several solutions 
have been proposed in videoconferencing environments through IP networks. 
 
Videoconferencing seems to be a perfect scenario to use multicast, since media 
flows generated by one source must be delivered to several destinations (see 
Figure 1). Unfortunately, in many situations multicast will not work between 
users so alternative solutions must be considered in case it is not available [2] 
[3]. 
 
 
Figure 1 Video conferencing in a Multicast Network 
 
 4 
Full Mesh 
In this architecture, each participant in a virtual meeting is sending his or her 
media flows to all other people in the meeting, as shown in Figure 2. It can also 
be understood as individual video phone calls between all participants in the 
conference. 
 
The weakness of this architecture is that each participant would need a lot of 
bandwidth to send the flows to all other participants. Also, a lot of bandwidth 
would be needed to receive all media flows coming from other participants. 
These reasons would limit the number of people on a meeting to the number of 
flows that can be fit in the Internet link bandwidth. 
 
The biggest strength of this solution is that no centralized architecture is 
needed, so it is inexpensive, no delays are introduced in the communication 
and all signalling is done as a peer-to-peer communication between the clients. 
 
It is clear that this could be a good solution for low quality video and audio 
flows, but it is unaffordable with high quality or High Definition flows because of 
their high bit rate. 
 
 
Figure 2 Full Mesh video conferencing 
 
Forwarding 
Another possible solution is to establish a centralized architecture, with a main 
node receiving all flows and replicating them to all other participants [2] [3] [4]. 
This central node is called Multipoint Control Unit (MCU) and it simulates a 
multicast network, since each participant is just sending one flow to the MCU 
but it could be finally delivered to all other participants. Users could be receiving 
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several flows too, as if they were in a multicast group with more than one media 
source. 
There are two operational ways to perform the media forwarding, depending if 
all flows are sent again to all participants or if just one flow is forwarded. 
 
In the first case, the MCU is certainly imitating a multicast network, since the 
topology will look like as if all participants were in the same multicast group (see 
Figure 3). 
 
The strength of this possibility is that each participant is only sending his or her 
media flow once, but it is finally delivered to all other participants. Anyway, all 
the flows from others must be received, so the download link must be also quite 
big. However, this situation seems perfect for asymmetric Internet links, such as 
ADSL. 
 
The biggest weaknesses of this system are the delays added by the central 
node and that it could become a bottleneck of the system, since it is a 
centralized element. Nevertheless, the delay can be minimized by using fast 
software and equipment and high speed lines. 
 
 
 
Figure 3 MCU forwarding all flows 
 
The second possibility using an MCU is to forward only one of the flows 
received from participants (see Figure 4). This helps to reduce the bandwidth 
needed to get the flows from other participants, but just allows seeing one of 
them. 
 
The most practical thing would be that the MCU was able to forward all audio 
flows and just the video one with the highest volume in the audio channel. 
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However, this is quite slow because the audio flow must be analyzed, so the 
delay added by the MCU could be high. 
A solution that has been proposed by forwarding-solution developers is to have 
a meeting director, who is able to switch the media flow forwarded by the MCU. 
He or she can see and hear media flows coming from all participants, but the 
other participants just receive the one the director chooses. This is a good 
solution for chaired meetings with a director giving speech turns. 
 
 
Figure 4 MCU forwarding one flow 
 
Another smart solution would be to analyze the audio stream and show the one 
with the highest sound volume. 
 
In some situations, like debates between two people, it would be interesting to 
forward more than one flow but not all of them. This could be performed the 
same way is done when forwarding just one. 
 
Media mixing 
The last architecture presented is also based on a central node to deal with 
media flows, but this one is not forwarding media as it comes from the 
participants. 
 
In these systems, the MCU should be able to create a new media flow 
compounded of all or some of the flows sent by the people in the meeting (see 
Figure 5). This will allow all participants to see and to hear each others by 
receiving just one flow. 
 
However, the mixing process could be very slow and the delays added in the 
MCU process too long for a video conference. 
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Moreover, thinking about High Definition conferences, it would make no sense 
for the users to send HD video flows if the MCU is downscaling them to create a 
new flow, since details will be lost. 
 
  
 
Figure 5 Media mixing MCU 
 
2.1.3. Current solutions 
Nowadays, video conferences over IP are very popular, mainly because of the 
low cost of high speed Internet lines. 
 
On one hand, video phone calls are still made inside of the instant messaging 
platforms (MSN Messenger, Yahoo! Messenger, AOL IM) or some specific 
software (NetMeeting, Skype), although some manufacturers are selling IP 
video phones (D-Link eye2eye videophone). 
 
On the other hand, there are several options for video conference calls. Closed 
solutions based on specific devices still exist, although most of them are based 
on open standards for signalling protocols and media transfers (Polycom, 
Tandberg or Cisco Unified Videoconferencing products). Also, some software 
solutions are available (NetMeeting). 
 
Even though most of these solutions offer a good security level (some of them 
use cipher, authentication and integrity standards), none of them is ready to 
work with high bit rate media flows, such as High Definition flows. 
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Also, some High Definition systems are present, but they are based on closed 
and private solutions and often can not work at the same time as secure 
systems. 
 
2.2. Signalling protocols for Internet conferences 
In order to establish a video conference over Internet, a signalling protocol must 
be used. In this area, lots of solutions have been implemented by 
manufacturers, but the most interesting ones are those based in open 
standards. 
 
There are two main standard protocols thought to be used in the establishment 
of media sessions over an IP network, such as phone calls or conferences: 
H323 and SIP [5]. 
 
2.2.1. H.323 
H.323 is a standardized protocol from the International Telecommunication 
Union (ITU). Its first version was released in 1996 and several revisions have 
been made on it. It was quickly adopted by operators as a signalling protocol 
used for VoIP and video conferences [5] [6]. 
 
Since the companies from the ITU are mostly phone operators and big 
telecommunications companies, H.323 describes very well defined rules to 
operate and it is oriented to be used in all kind of networks, like IP, PSTN or 
ISDN. 
 
However, their main weaknesses are that it is not flexible, it is difficult to provide 
different services with it and it is a very heavy protocol, what makes it non-
scalable. 
 
2.2.2. The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) 
The Session Initiation Protocol is an application-layer control protocol for 
creating, modifying and terminating sessions with one or more participants, 
including multicast sessions [7]. It was defined by the Internet Engineering Task 
Force (IETF) in the RFC 2543 from 1996 and it is used in VoIP solutions and 
3GPP mobile technology. It was updated in 2002 in the RFC 3261. 
 
SIP can be delivered over any transport-layer protocol, such as UDP, TCP or 
SCTP, although it is commonly transported over UDP. It is a text-based 
protocol, as HTTP, so it can easily be read by humans. This make it a little 
inefficient in comparison to H.323, but at the same time gives it the possibility to 
interact with other Internet technologies, like web sites (using SIPlets), and 
reuse components from other IETF protocols, like HTTP or SMTP [7]. 
 
As a signalling protocol, SIP does not care about the media transfers, so it is 
often used together with RTP/RTCP. However, SIP can also be used in Event 
Subscription and Notification, Session Mobility and Instant Message solutions. 
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Whereas H.323 is a very well defined protocol with strong rules, the main 
strength of SIP is its flexibility and that allows developers to easily design new 
services using it. Also, the SIP philosophy is to give the clients the intelligence, 
so the network core can be very simple and the system becomes very scalable 
[5]. 
SIP Actors 
The Session Initiation Protocol is based on the operation of several actors that 
will exchange messages in order to establish a session. These actors are the 
ones listed and explained below [2] [5] [7]: 
 
• User Agent Client: applications that generates SIP requests 
• User Agent Server: applications that processes SIP requests and 
generates SIP responses 
• User Agent: applications that interact with the final user. They are 
usually made of a User Agent Client (UAC) to generate requests and a 
User Agent Server (UAS) to process requests and generate responses. 
• SIP Proxy: these elements help to route requests and responses to the 
current location of the receiver of a message 
• SIP Registrar: these elements are a special type of proxy. They are the 
responsible to inform the callers for the actual location of the users of 
that domain, by resolving to a network address. All SIP users in the 
domain which the registrar is responsible for would have to register on 
them 
 
SIP messages 
SIP is based in the message exchange between the initiator of the session and 
the receiver or receivers. These messages are divided in a first line, a header 
and a body (see Figure 6) [7]. 
 
 
Figure 6 SIP packet schema 
 
The first line of a SIP message is reserved to indicate the main purpose of the 
packet, the destination of the message and the protocol version. An example of 
a first line of a SIP message could be the following: 
 
INVITE sip:user1@minisip.org SIP/2.0 
 
In this example, the caller would be inviting user1@minisip.org to establish 
a session using version 2 of the SIP protocol. 
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In the protocol definition, there is a set of SIP methods defined. The most used 
ones are the following: 
 
• INVITE is used to request the start of a session to another user 
• REGISTER is used to get registered into the client’s registrar 
• ACK is used to acknowledge the receipt of a message 
• BYE is used to end the session 
• OPTIONS is used to request client or server capabilities 
• CANCEL is used to cancel a request 
• INFO is used to exchange control info once the session is established 
 
Apart from these messages, there is a code defined for the responses to the 
messages. It is similar to the code defined for responses in HTTP and is based 
on a number and an optional explanation sentence [7]: 
 
• Codes 100 to 182: informational messages, such as 100 Trying or 
180 Ringing 
• Code 200: success message, 200 OK 
• Codes 300 to 302: redirection messages, like 301 Moved 
Permanently 
• Codes 400 to 486: client error messages, such as 401 Unauthorized 
• Codes 500 to 505: server error messages, like 500 Not 
Implemented 
• Code 600 to 606: global failure messages, as 603 Decline 
 
Also, any message could be added. This is one of the most important features 
of SIP and what gives its flexibility. By adding new messages, it is possible to 
perform different behaviours in the User Agents (sending instant messages, 
sending files, sending XML parameters, …), so then SIP can be used as a 
signal protocol for lots of applications. 
 
The second parameter in the first line is called the SIP Uniform Resource 
Identifier (SIP-URI). This is the identifier of a user or a device and it is like the 
phone number in the traditional phone networks or the email address in the 
email system. Its structure is very similar to email addresses, using @ symbol to 
separate the user name from the domain name or the network address. The 
main structure of the SIP-URI would be this: 
 
sip:[user:password@]hostname|ipv4addr|ipv6addr[:port;
params] 
 
Some examples of SIP-URIs could be the following: 
 
• sip:user1@minisip.org 
• sip:user2@212.45.63.24:5060 
• sip:user:mypassword@147.83.115.46 
• sip:+34-93-4557644@gateway.minisip.org;user=Dave 
 
To enable everybody to contact with a SIP-URI, a mechanism to translate a 
SIP-URI to the current location network address of the user must be performed. 
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For that reason, every user should register to the SIP registrar of his or her 
domain.  
 
To find a user given his or her SIP-URI, a client should find first his or her SIP 
registrar. To achieve this, the process is similar to the one done in SMTP mail 
exchanges and it usually involves a Domain Name Server (DNS) request to get 
the SRV entry for that domain. This operation can also be done by a SIP proxy 
on behalf of the original client. 
 
After the first line of the SIP packet, a structured header of the packet is 
enclosed. It is very similar to HTTP or SMTP headers and it describes the 
caller, the callee, the path and the message type. There are 37 different 
headers and they can be divided into 4 main groups [5] [7]: 
 
• General headers: used both in request and response messages 
• Request headers: used in request messages to add extra information 
• Response headers: used in response messages to add extra 
information 
• Entity headers: indicates the length and the content type in the body of 
the message 
 
The most important and most used headers are explained below: 
 
• Via: indicates the path (SIP proxies) the message took to arrive to the 
destination 
• Max-Forwards: indicates the number of hops the message can do 
before to arrive to destination. Each proxy server that forwards this 
message would decrease by one this parameter 
• To: indicates the name and the SIP-URI of the destination of the 
message 
• From: indicates the name and the SIP-URI of the source of the message 
• Call-ID: unique identification number of the session 
• Command-sequence: sequence number of the message and SIP 
method 
o Incremented by one for each new message 
o The same number for the responses to a message 
• Subject: indicates the subject of the session established 
• Contact: indicates the SIP-URI to contact directly the source of the 
message 
• Content-type: indicates the type of content in the message body 
• Content-length: indicates the length of the body of the message 
• Accept: indicates if the message body is accepted by the client 
• Accept language: indicates the preferred language of the user to 
receive messages 
• Date: time of the first request 
• Encryption: indicates the preferred algorithm to encrypt the body of the 
messages 
• Record-route: used by proxies to demand all messages to go through it 
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• Require: indicates the functionalities the client needs to be performed to 
accept the session 
• Supported: indicates the features supported by a server 
• Timestamp: used by the clients to calculate the round trip time delay 
 
Finally, a SIP message can also include a body. It is optional and it usually 
carries information about the session established or non-SIP parameters to be 
exchanged. 
 
Session Description Protocol (SDP) 
In order to use SIP to establish a media session (i.e. a phone call), it is 
necessary to agree upon parameters for the session. The caller and the callee 
must agree which CODEC and which protocols to use, where to send the media 
flows and where to receive them. 
 
These parameters are not agreed in the SIP message exchange, so another 
protocol should be used in the SIP message body to do so (see Figure 7). This 
protocol is the Session Description Protocol (SDP), which is another IETF 
protocol designed to define media session initialization parameters [8] [9]. 
 
 
Figure 7 SIP packet with SDP 
 
Using SDP, participants can define information related to the type of media 
(audio, video, …), the CODEC (MPEG, PCM, GSM, …), the transport protocol 
(UDP, RTP, SCTP, …) and port numbers. 
 
Nowadays, the protocol is described in the RFC 4566 and it defines the 
following list of attributes to define media sessions: 
 
Session description 
• v: protocol version 
• o: originator and session identifier 
• s: session name 
• i: extra session information 
• u: URI of description 
• e: email address 
• p: phone number 
• c: connection information 
• b: bandwidth information 
• z: time zone adjustments 
• k: encryption key 
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• a: session attribute 
 
Time description 
• t: time the session is active 
• r: repeat times 
 
Media description 
• m: media name and transport address 
• i: media title 
• c: connection information 
• b: bandwidth information 
• k: encryption key 
• a: media attributes 
 
SIP dialog 
As said above, SIP is a protocol based in the message exchange between SIP 
User Agents in the clients. Attending to this and taking into account all 
explained about SIP, an example of a SIP dialog to establish a video phone call 
is presented. 
 
Imagine two users, Alice and Bob, with their SIP-URIs, alice@kth.se and 
bob@mnisip.org. Alice wants to make a video phone call to Bob and she 
knows about Bob’s SIP-URI but not about his IP address, his location nor his 
SIP Proxy Registrar. The dialog to establish a call will be the one shown in 
Figure 8. 
 
 
Figure 8 Video phone call establishment SIP dialog 
 
The messages in Figure 8 would be the following: 
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• Message 1: Bob is registering in the SIP Proxy Registrar responsible for 
the domain minisip.org, which is sip.minisip.org. The content of 
the SIP message would be this: 
 
REGISTER sip:sip.minisip.org SIP/2.0 
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 2.3.4.5:5060 
From: sip:bob@minisip.org 
Contact: Bob <sip:bob@2.3.4.5:5060> 
CSeq: 1 REGISTER 
Call-ID: 2e45f4678@2.3.4.5 
Expires: 7200 
 
• Message 2: when Alice wants to contact Bob, she sends an INVITE 
message through her SIP Proxy. This message contains an SDP 
message in the body, in order to offer Bob several options to establish 
the media session. 
 
INVITE sip:bob@minisip.org SIP/2.0 
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 1.2.3.4:5060 
From: sip:alice@kth.se 
To: sip:bob@minisip.org 
Call-ID: 2023@1.2.3.4 
CSeq: 1 INVITE 
Content-type: application/sdp 
v=0 
s=Video phone call 
e=alice@kth.se 
c=IN IP4 1.2.3.4 
t=0 0 
m=audio 10000 RTP/AVP 0 8 
a=rtpmap:0 PCMU/8000 
a=rtpmap:8 PCMA/8000 
m=video 10001 RTP/AVP 34 
a=rtpmap:34 H263/90000 
 
In this SDP, Alice is offering Bob to use either PCMU or PCMA audio 
codec in her UDP port 10000 over RTP and H263 video codec in her 
UDP port 10001 also over RTP for the video phone call. 
 
• Message 3: since Alice SIP proxy (sip.kth.se) does not know about 
Bob’s SIP Proxy, it makes a DNS Request in order to get its address. 
The proxy would ask for the SRV entry and it would indicate to find a SIP 
and UDP capable server. 
 
• Message 4: the DNS response would include the name of the SIP proxy 
for minisip.org domain as well as its IP address. 
 
• Message 5: now, sip.kth.se can forward the Alice INVITE message 
to sip.minisip.org, adding a Via header in the SIP header: 
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INVITE sip:bob@minisip.org SIP/2.0 
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP sip.kth.se:5060 
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 1.2.3.4:5060 
From: sip:alice@kth.se 
To: sip:bob@minisip.org 
Call-ID: 2023@1.2.3.4 
CSeq: 1 INVITE 
Content-type: application/sdp 
v=0 
s=Video phone call 
e=alice@kth.se 
c=IN IP4 1.2.3.4 
t=0 0 
m=audio 10000 RTP/AVP 0 8 
a=rtpmap:0 PCMU/8000 
a=rtpmap:8 PCMA/8000 
m=video 10001 RTP/AVP 34 
a=rtpmap:34 H263/90000 
 
• Message 6: the INVITE message would be finally delivered to Bob by 
his SIP Proxy, adding another Via header: 
 
INVITE sip:bob@minisip.org SIP/2.0 
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP sip.kth.se:5060 
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 1.2.3.4:5060 
From: sip:alice@kth.se 
To: sip:bob@minisip.org 
Call-ID: 2023@1.2.3.4 
Cseq: 1 INVITE 
Content-type: application/sdp 
v=0 
s=Video phone call 
e=alice@kth.se 
c=IN IP4 1.2.3.4 
t=0 0 
m=audio 10000 RTP/AVP 0 8 
a=rtpmap:0 PCMU/8000 
a=rtpmap:8 PCMA/8000 
m=video 10001 RTP/AVP 34 
a=rtpmap:34 H263/90000 
 
• Messages 7, 8 and 9: Bob’s User Agent would send a 180 Ringing to 
Alice in order to inform her User Agent the INVITE message was 
received. This message is going to be forwarded back to Alice through 
the SIP Proxies, each one of them adding a Via Header. 
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SIP/2.0 180 Ringing 
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 2.3.4.5:5060 
From: sip:alice@kth.se 
To: sip:bob@minisip.org 
Call-ID: 2023@1.2.3.4 
Cseq: 1 INVITE 
Content-length:0 
 
• Messages 10, 11 and 12: as soon as Bob picks up the phone, his User 
Agent would send a 200 OK response to Alice. This message is also 
going to be delivered through the proxies, since Bob does not know yet 
Alice’s address. 
 
SIP/2.0 200 OK 
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 2.3.4.5:5060 
From: sip:bob@minisip.org  
To:sip:alice@kth.se 
Call-ID: 2023@1.2.3.4 
Cseq: 1 INVITE 
Content-type: application/sdp 
v=0 
s=Video phone call 
e=bob@minisip.org 
c=IN IP4 2.3.4.5 
t=0 0 
m=audio 20000 RTP/AVP 0 8 
a=rtpmap:8 PCMA/8000 
m=video 20500 RTP/AVP 34 
a=rtpmap:34 H263/90000 
 
In the SDP message, Bob chooses to use PCMA over RTP in his 20000 
UDP port for the audio flow and H263 over RTP in his 20500 UDP port 
for the video flow. 
 
• Message 13: when Alice gets the 200 OK message from Bob, she 
sends an acknowledgement for this message to tell Bob she accepts the 
parameters Bob chose. At this moment and thanks to the Via headers, 
Alice knows Bob’s location, so this message is sent directly to Bob. 
 
ACK sip:bob@minisip.org SIP/2.0 
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 1.2.3.4:5060 
From: sip:alice@kth.se 
To: sip:bob@minisip.org 
Call-ID: 2023@1.2.3.4 
Cseq: 1 ACK 
Content-length: 0 
 
If Alice did not accept Bob’s SDP offer (either for the CODEC, the port or 
anything else), she would send a CANCEL message instead. Then, the 
connection would be closed. 
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• Message 14: Alice and Bob will be sending each other 2 RTP flows 
containing audio and video information. They should use the CODECs 
and the ports they agreed in the SIP dialog, thanks to the SDP protocol. 
 
• Message 15: when the video phone call ends, Alice would hang up and 
media flows would stop sending. At this moment, her User Agent is going 
to send a BYE message to Bob’s User Agent, so it notices the call is 
over. 
 
BYE sip:bob@minisip.org SIP/2.0 
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 1.2.3.4:5060 
From: sip:alice@kth.se 
To: sip:bob@minisip.org 
Call-ID: 2023@1.2.3.4 
Cseq: 345 BYE 
Content-length: 0 
 
• Message 16: finally, Bob would accept the end of the call by sending a 
200 OK message to Alice. 
 
SIP/2.0 200 OK 
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 2.3.4.5:5060 
From: sip:bob@minisip.org  
To: sip:alice@kth.se 
Call-ID: 2023@1.2.3.4 
Cseq: 345 BYE 
Content-length: 0 
 
2.3. Dealing with media in video conference environments 
Once the signalling protocol agrees the parameters to establish a media 
session, data flows containing audio, video or other kind of information can be 
sent by participants. 
 
However, it is necessary to define some protocols to allow participants to read 
correctly these media flows. 
 
2.3.1. Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) 
The Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) is a standardized packet format 
designed to deliver media contents (mostly video and audio, but also images) 
over an IP network [10]. It was first defined in 1996 as RFC 1889, which was 
replaced by RFC 3550 in 2003. 
 
It was originally thought as an add-on for the UDP protocol in media 
environments, although it can be also delivered over a TCP layer. It has no 
defined port to be delivered, so it is usually delivered in the wide area of non-
defined ports. However, it is said in the standard that RTP must use an even 
port and the Real-time Transport Control Protocol (RTCP) use the next odd 
port. 
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An RTP packet is divided into a 12-bytes header and a payload (see Figure 9). 
The payload would carry the data of the packet and in the header the following 
information is provided [5]: 
 
• RTP Version [V] (2 bits): indicates the version of the protocol. Current 
version is 2 
• Padding [P] (1 bit): indicates if there is extra information at the end of 
the packet, in order to exactly fit on an 8 bit alignment 
• Extension [X] (1 bit): indicates if any extension of the protocol is used in 
the packet 
• Contributors [NCSRC] (2 bits): indicates the number of contributors to 
that session. It is used to read the CSRC optional headers 
• Marker bit [N] (1 bit): it is used to inform the application that something 
special is in that packet. Usually is always off in audio streams and 1 in 
video packets containing the last information of a frame 
• Payload type [PT] (7 bits): identifier of the type of data in the payload of 
the packet. Usually it is an identifier of the codec used in the media 
transported, defined in the RFC 3551 
• Sequence number [SN] (8 bits): sequence numbers increased by one 
at each packet 
• Timestamp [TMP] (16 bits): time of the acquisition of the first sample 
carried by the packet 
• Synchronization source identifier [SSRC] (16 bits): identifier of the 
source of the packet 
• Contributing source identifier [CSRC] (16 bits): identifier of the 
contributors to the media session. It is optional and it will be one for each 
participant when the media goes through a mixer 
 
 
Figure 9 RTP packet schema 
 
The RTCP protocol was designed as a brother protocol of RTP in the same 
RFC 3550. It is usually transmitted periodically together with an RTP flow and 
provides quality of service feedback and control information to the source and 
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the receiver of the media flow, like timestamps linking to Network Time Protocol 
(NTP) times or changing CODEC requests.  
 
2.3.2. Delays and Video coders 
In a video conference, video flows should be treated in a special way. In these 
environments the delay must be as small as possible, in order to give the 
participants the feeling that they are in front of each other. 
 
Attending to the interactivity ITU recommendation, the maximum delay between 
each part should not be longer than 150ms (Round Trip Time <= 300ms). This 
means that a participant should see and listen what happened in the other 
participants’ rooms 150ms before. This is really difficult to achieve with 
nowadays technologies if one consider using HD video, but gives the idea on 
how the delay should be considered. 
 
To measure the delay, several times must be taken into account: acquisition 
time, compression time, packetizing time, network transmission time, 
unpacketizing time, decompression time and jitter-control display buffer time 
(Figure 10). 
 
 
Figure 10 Video conferencing delays 
 
Regarding to this time schema, it is easy to realize that the less is the 
compression/decompression time, the less is the total delay of the system. So 
then, it is a good idea to use media CODECs that do not take too much time to 
compress media or even not to compress it, always trying to compromise 
compression time and network transmission time. 
 
Digital Video (DV) 
This format of video is the one used by most of the domestic video cameras. It 
consists in raw PAL/NTSC images usually obtained through the Firewire 
interface (IEEE 1394). It mixes in a single 25Mbps flow video and audio signals. 
 
Since no compression is applied and the output bit rate seems quite reduced, it 
could be valid for a first approach in video conferencing. However, having the 
audio and video flows mixed could be a problem if the sound is the parameter 
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analyzed to decide which flow is being showed. Moreover, the quality of the 
video flow is just PAL/NTSC, which means is no High Definition. 
 
High Definition Digital Video (HDV) 
This format is the High-Definition evolution of the Digital Video format. It offers 
the possibility to fit in a 25Mbps flow an audio and a HD video flow [12]. 
However, MPEG-2 compression is applied, so the delay is increased. 
 
Because of the compression introduced by HDV cameras, this seems not to be 
a right format for High-Definition video conferencing. 
 
MPEG4/H.264 
The MPEG4 or H.264 codec is the newest video coder from the Moving 
Pictures Experts Group (MPEG) and the ITU. It uses several techniques to 
compress the image flow, such as backward and forward movement prediction, 
wavelet transform (like JPEG200 standard) and adaptive quantifiers. 
 
These techniques make possible to obtain high-quality results with a contained 
bit rate, which is what is looked for High Definition video conferencing. 
 
This standard was designed to be delivered through a packet network, so it was 
defined also as an RTP encapsulation for it in order to improve the efficiency. 
 
Most of the current commercial video conferencing solutions offered by 
manufacturers support and take advantage of this standard, usually 
implementing a proprietary profile of it. However, and specially because of the 
delay introduced by the forward movement prediction used in most of H.264 
implementations, the delay introduced when using them is long enough not to 
be used in video conferencing environments. 
 
Several studies are being done in this area at the moment, most of them 
focused on reducing the compression time avoiding the forward movement 
prediction. 
 
2.4. Security issues 
Until this part of the document, several protocols and solutions have been 
studied. However, no security aspects have been taken into account. 
 
There are several ways to secure these protocols and different security levels 
for each one, so they must be analyzed. 
 
2.4.1. Security definitions 
First of all, it is necessary to define what means that the different subjects that 
can be secured in a communication through a packet network. 
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Confidentiality 
In a packet switched network and especially in Internet, there is no possibility to 
control the path our packets will take. This means that anybody could be 
listening on the network and looking at the information inside our packets or the 
packets sent to us. 
 
Confidentiality means that only authorized people can read the information in a 
message. This is usually achieved by encrypting all the information transferred 
through the network. 
 
Integrity 
As said above, there is no chance to control our packets along their path to the 
destination. Anybody could modify the information on them and the receiver 
would not notice. 
 
To avoid that, some procedures must be done in order to ensure that the 
receiver is getting exactly what the sender sent, without modifications. This is 
often done by hash codes of some information the sender and the receiver 
know and some information in the message. 
 
Authentication and non-repudiation 
Authentication is needed in order to make sure somebody is who he or she 
claims to be. It is absolutely necessary to be sure the receiver of the information 
is the right one to provide full-secured communications. 
 
Usually, authentication is merged with non-repudiation. This means that a party 
in a dispute cannot refuse he or she did something 
 
Both properties are usually achieved by a digital signature procedure, using a 
Public Key Infrastructures (PKI), and also provide integrity. 
 
Availability 
It is important for a service to be available for as much time as possible. In order 
to avoid down times, it is necessary to think about different techniques to 
prevent Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. 
 
Public Key Infrastructure 
A Public Key Infrastructure is a set of technologies, policies and procedures that 
allow the secure use of cryptographic methods, such as ciphering or digital 
signature [13]. 
 
Usually, a PKI is based on the operation of one or more Certificate Authorities 
(CAs). These authorities are responsible of several user certificates and can 
assure to anybody that who is using a certificate is who he or she says. 
However, it is necessary to trust the CA. 
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A certificate contains a pair of public-private keys that can be used in 
asymmetrical cryptography procedures, like digital signature or data 
authentication. 
 
2.4.2. Securing SIP 
Although of its diverse advantages, SIP shows a severe disadvantage since it 
does not provide any security measure to secure the protocol itself. To do so, it 
relies on other generic protocols, such as Transport Layer Security (TLS) or IP-
Security (IPSec) [7].  
 
Several things can be protected in a SIP communication, so it is important to 
offer solutions for all the issues. 
 
Securing communications 
As seen in the SIP dialog above, SIP was designed as a non-encrypted 
protocol, so its messages are transmitted as plain text. This is a very important 
security problem because anybody could see user activities, such as in or out 
calls or instant messages sent using SIP. To solve this, SIP offers the solution 
to use TLS, establishing hop by hop TLS links between all nodes in the dialog 
[14] [17]. 
 
In order to require this security measure, a new SIP-URI has been created, the 
SIPS-URI. The format of the new address is the one below: 
 
sips:[user:password@]hostname|ipv4addr|ipv6addr[:port
;params] 
 
By using a SIPS-URI, intermediate nodes will be forced to establish secure links 
between them using TLS [7]. All connections will be then secured, except the 
one between the destination proxy and the destination user, which could be 
secured or not depending on the policy of the SIP proxy [14]. If one of the hopes 
can not be secured, the connection should fail. 
 
Using the example of the SIP dialog above, the blue areas over SIP messages 
in Figure 11 would be the TLS secured connections: 
 
 
Figure 11 Secure SIP dialog using TLS 
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Nevertheless, before creating the TLS links between the proxies, they will need 
to authenticate each other, so a PKI will be needed. Since it could be useful to 
provide security in other aspects of video conferencing, the use of a PKI seems 
to be a logical solution. 
 
Securing register 
When a user is registering to his or her SIP Registrar, some security measures 
must be taken into account. The SIP Registrar must assure the user is who he 
or she claims to be by authenticating them before they can register. 
 
To do so, SIP offers two authentication schemas, similar to the ones offered by 
HTTP: 
• Basic authentication: this schema is very weak because it is based on 
sending as clear text user and password. For this reason, it has been 
deprecated. 
 
• Digest challenge: the user tries to get registered in the SIP Registrar 
with no authentication and the server denies the request and attaches a 
nonce to the CANCEL message [7]. Then, the user would make another 
REGISTER request, by adding to the packet the result of the MD5 hash 
function over the nonce, the user and the password. If everything goes 
right, the user gets registered (see Figure 12). 
 
 
Figure 12 SIP digest challenge authentication 
 
Though it seems the digest challenge method could be enough, the user is not 
authenticating the server, so a fake server could impersonate him or her. The 
solution for that is again the use of a PKI to authenticate the client and the 
server and the TLS protocol to protect network communications. 
 
Securing the body message 
Another possibility would be to secure only the body of the SIP messages. This 
will not protect the signalling information but SDP messages or any other 
information contained in the body message (like instant messenger texts) could 
be at least protected. 
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SIP specifies the use of the Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extension 
(S/MIME) to provide confidentiality, integrity and authentication to the body of 
SIP messages by using a PKI [13] [14] [15]. 
 
Securing the whole SIP message 
By using S/MIME it is also possible to protect the whole SIP packet, including 
the headers. This technique copies the whole SIP message (headers and body) 
inside the body (Figure 13) [16] [17]. 
 
Then, S/MIME is used to provide confidentiality, integrity and authentication to 
the body of the SIP message, which contains the whole original packet. The 
receiver of the message should decrypt the body and compare the copied 
message inside with the whole packet. 
 
If both messages are equal, no changes had been made on them. However, if 
not, some changes had been made in the packet. 
 
This system should take into account that some proxies could add headers to 
the SIP message, like Via headers. This makes it difficult to be implemented 
and adds computational complexity to the SIP message dealing process. 
 
 
Figure 13 Securing the whole SIP message 
 
Another problem of this procedure is that the resultant UDP message would 
probably be bigger than the network MTU so UDP packets will be fragmented. 
This is a problem because the standard configuration of the most spread SIP 
proxy (SIP Express Router) [26] discards all fragmented packets. A solution for 
that could be using a reliable transport protocol (such as TCP or TLS) to deliver 
these messages, as the standard says. 
 
 25 
2.4.3. Securing Media: Secure RTP (SRTP) 
There are several options to secure the content of the media flows, depending 
of which level of the TCP/IP stack is protected. 
 
One option is to use IPSec tunnels between participants [18], which is a very 
heavy solution because it is protecting the network layer. Another possibility is 
to use Secure RTP to protect the RTP flows carrying media, which is a smart 
solution for communications over Internet because only application layer is 
protected. 
 
Attending to previous studies in this area [16] [18], the use of SRTP seems 
more convenient for video conferencing environments, since it is a close 
environment to VoIP. 
 
The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) is a profile to secure the RTP 
media transport protocol specified by the proposed standard in the RFC 3711 
[19]. 
 
The protocol is thought to provide confidentiality, authentication and integrity to 
the packets of an RTP flow, although only encryption is mandatory. The security 
is applied to the packet as Figure 14 shows. 
 
 
Figure 14 SRTP schema 
 
Several security issues, such as confidentiality, authentication and integrity, can 
be solved by using SRTP to protect RTP media flows. 
 
Confidentiality: AES 
In the SRTP draft, confidentiality is achieved by encrypting only the payload of 
the RTP packets. The encryption is provided by the Advanced Encryption 
Standard (AES) algorithm used in the cipher-stream mode, instead of the block 
cipher performed usually by AES [13]. 
 
The use of AES instead of some other algorithms is not a coincidence. The 
main reason to choose AES in front of other algorithms is its low computational 
requirements and that it is often implemented in hardware. These 
characteristics allow this algorithm to be used in low computational devices [14], 
such as mobile phones or PDAs, and give it the possibility to encrypt high bit 
rate flows using powerful machines. 
 
AES describes three different procedures to work under the cipher-stream 
mode, but only two of them are used in SRTP: 
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• NULL cipher: it can be used to disable encryption, when authentication 
and integrity protection are needed, but not confidentiality. 
 
The operation of this mode is very simple: it just copies the input to the 
output, with no changes in the payload of the RTP packet. 
 
• Segmented Integer Counter Mode: this mode is based in typical 
counter mode behaviour, using one-time-pad keys to cipher the plaintext. 
The main advantage of this mode is that one-time-pad keys can be pre-
computed and then used in the XOR with the plaintext [13]. 
 
This is the default algorithm for SRTP and it uses a 128 bits default 
encryption key and a 112 bits default session salt key. 
 
In the below schema (Figure 15), it is shown how the default AES Block 
Cipher is used in counter-mode. The Initialization Vector (IV in the figure) 
depends on the source identifier (SSRC), the packet index (Sequence 
Number) and the salting key. 
 
 
Figure 15 AES counter-mode 
 
Authentication and Integrity: HMAC 
Although the RTP packets were ciphered, anybody in the network could 
manipulate them or even replace them. This could be a big security hole, 
because reply attacks can be done against a receiver, making impossible to him 
or her to receive any media. 
 
To solve these issues, authentication and integrity protection must be provided. 
This is achieved by a keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) 
based on a Security Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA-1) hashing function. This function 
returns a Message Authentication Code (MAC), which is added to the RTP 
packet with a ciphered payload. 
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A keyed-Hash Message Authentication code is obtained applying a hash 
function to the content to be protected, an authentication key and two defined 
padding (opad, ipad) [13]. Note that the hash is applied after the encryption is 
done and it protects also the RTP headers. 
 
The default authentication key should be 128 bits and the HMAC-SHA-1 
algorithm will generate a 160-bit hash code. In SRTP this hash code is 
truncated to the last 32 bits (4 bytes) [19], in order not to add too much 
overhead to the media flow (Figure 16). 
 
Finally, a 4-byte Master Key Identifier is also added to the packet, in order to 
inform the receiver which crypto context (encryption key, authentication key and 
salt key) was used to protect that packet (Figure 16). 
 
 
Figure 16 SRTP HMAC generation 
 
SRTP cryptographic issues 
As stated, SRTP uses a master key to obtain the other keys used to protect the 
RTP packets, but the draft says nothing about how to share this master key 
between the source and the destination. 
 
In order to get an encryption key, an authentication key and a salt key from the 
same master key, a derivation function is used to generate this crypto context 
(Figure 17) [19]. By this way, only a master key needs to be exchanged. 
 
 
Figure 17 SRTP crypto context creation 
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Moreover, SRTP could become insecure if the same key is used to cipher more 
than 248 packets, a number fixed because of the rollover counter and the 
sequence number lengths. With this amount of ciphered data, the possible 
attacker could obtain information and break the cryptographic session. In order 
to avoid this, a re-keying protocol to generate a new crypt context is needed 
too. 
 
2.4.4. Key Agreement: MIKEY 
There are some existing key agreement implementations, such as the Internet 
Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP) framework and 
the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol [14]. Both of them provide several 
levels of security. 
 
However, there is a very specific option for protecting multimedia exchanges: 
the Multimedia Internet Keying (MIKEY) [20]. It is been revealed as the best 
option when using SIP to establish secured multimedia sessions [14] [18]. 
 
The purpose of MIKEY is to exchange cryptographic parameters in the media 
negotiation process. This, when using SDP over SIP to establish media 
sessions, means that MIKEY should be able to perform a mutual authentication 
and agree a master key in just one roundtrip. 
 
MIKEY defines a way to exchange a master key, called Transport Generation 
Key (TGK). From this TGK, MIKEY is able to get a Transport Encryption Key 
(TEK), which will be the one used as the SRTP master key (see Figure 18) [14] 
[20]. The protocol also provides a mechanism to exchange other security 
parameters. 
 
 
Figure 18 MIKEY operation 
 
Solved security issues 
Several security issues can be protected by using MIKEY. The most important 
ones are the following: 
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• Mutual authentication: it allows the authentication of both parts in the 
media session by the use of a challenge/response scheme. 
 
To fit the challenge/response scheme in the offer/answer model, 
basically reducing by one the number of exchanged messages, MIKEY 
uses timestamps as challenges. 
 
Using timestamps in combination with an authentication key, allows the 
participants to verify the identity of each other. 
 
• Replay protection: it prevents the use of the same timestamp to 
authenticate for twice. 
 
When a timestamp is received, it is stored locally and every new MIKEY 
message should use a later timestamp than the stored ones. 
 
• Perfect forward secrecy: using Diffie-Hellman agreement schema, it is 
possible to assure that even if a private key is revealed, there is no 
chance to compromise the keys used in a crypto session. 
 
This is possible because a completely new and random TGK is agreed 
every time a connection starts. 
 
Key agreement types 
Depending on the computational resources and the authentication procedures 
available, MIKEY describes three types of key agreements [20]: 
 
• Pre-shared key (PSK): in this type of agreement, Alice and Bob must 
share a secret in advance. 
 
Assuming K as the pre-shared secret, RAND as random generated 
string, ID as the user identifier, constant1 and constant2 as two well-
known byte strings and f() as a pseudo-random function defined in the 
MIKEY draft, the key agreement would work as shown in Figure 19. 
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Figure 19 MIKEY PSK key agreement 
 
Alice generates an encryption key and an authentication key. Then she 
sends a Timestamp, a random string, her user identifier, the MIKEY TGK 
key encrypted with the generated encryption key and a MAC to protect 
the whole message using the generated authentication key. 
 
Then, Bob generates the encryption key and the authentication key with 
the parameters he received from Alice. These keys should be the same 
as Alice generated, since the parameters used to generate them are the 
same. So then, Bob can decrypt the TGK key and can check the MAC 
Alice sent. 
 
After that, Bob answers with a Timestamp, his user identifier and a MAC 
to protect the message with the generated authentication key. 
 
Finally, Alice checks the MAC to make sure that Bob is the one who sent 
this message. 
 
• Public-key encryption (PKE): in this type of agreement, Alice and Bob 
must have each a pair of public/private keys. It is also needed a PKI in 
order to validate user keys in front of other users. 
 
Assuming rand() as a random function that generates a random byte 
stream, RAND as random generated string, ID as the user identifier, 
constant1 and constant2 as two well-known byte strings and f() as a 
pseudo-random function defined in the MIKEY draft, the key agreement 
would work as shown in Figure 20. 
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Figure 20 MIKEY PKE key agreement 
 
Alice generates an envelope key with a random function. With the result 
of that function, an encryption key and an authentication key are 
generated. Then she sends a Timestamp, a random string, her user 
identifier, the MIKEY TGK key encrypted with the generated encryption 
key, a MAC to protect the whole message using the generated 
authentication key and the envelope key encrypted with Bob’s public key. 
 
Then, Bob decrypts the envelope key using his private key. With the 
clear envelope key, he generates the encryption key and the 
authentication key with the other parameters he received from Alice. 
These keys should be the same as Alice generated, since the 
parameters used to generate them are the same. So then, Bob can 
decrypt the TGK key and can check the MAC Alice sent. 
After that, Bob answers with a Timestamp, his user identifier and a MAC 
to protect the message with the generated authentication key. 
 
Finally, Alice checks the MAC to make sure that Bob is the one who sent 
this message. 
 
• Signed Diffie-Hellman (DH): in this type of agreement, Alice and Bob 
must have each a pair of public/private keys. It is also needed a PKI in 
order to validate user keys in front of other users and complicate man-in-
the-middle attacks, since the attacker would need both Alice an Bob 
private keys. 
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Figure 21 MIKEY Signed DH key agreement 
 
Alice generates a random number (x) and sends to Bob a Timestamp, a 
random byte stream, her user identifier or her certificate, gx mod p, a set 
of parameters used in the Diffie-Hellman algorithm (basically g and p, 
defined by a DH_group identifier) and a signature of the message. 
 
Bob generates a random number (y) and answers Alice with a 
Timestamp, his user identifier or his certificate, gy mod p, gx mod p, the 
DH_group and a signature of the whole message. 
 
Then, both Alice and Bob can calculate a TGK as gxy mod p. This TGK is 
generated randomly, so that is why is said that Signed Diffie-Hellman key 
exchange preserves the perfect forward secrecy, since a new key 
agreement would generate a completely different TGK [13] [20]. 
 
MIKEY in the SIP dialog 
One of the main design goals of MIKEY is to fit the key agreement in the media 
negotiation process, usually done by SIP. The reason why MIKEY should 
perform the key agreement and the mutual authentication in just one roundtrip 
is that the SIP call establishment is done in just one roundtrip. 
 
To achieve that, MIKEY key agreement is performed in the INVITE transaction, 
by adding a new SDP attribute: key-mgmt. This attribute can be set as a 
session attribute or as a media attribute (see Figure 22) [14]. 
In the first case, the exchanged TEK will protect all the streams agreed in that 
session. In the second, a TEK will be exchanged for every flow described and it 
will be used only to protect only media in that flow. 
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Figure 22 SIP and MIKEY 
 
In case re-keying is needed, it should be performed by a RE-INVITE 
transaction, conducted the same way as the INVITE transaction did. 
 
Dealing with non-secured SIP UAs should also be considered. If a secured UA 
invites a non-secured UA, the latter is going to omit the key-mgmt attribute in 
the SDP of the 200 OK message. In that case, the first UA should give the user 
the option to fall back to an unsecured session initiation (adding another SDP 
media descriptor in the INVITE message) or to cancel the communication. 
 
In the last case, when the callee UA does not accept a non-secure call and the 
caller policy is do not accept unsecured calls, the receiver could suffer from 
ghost ringing. Since the 200 OK message is not sent until the callee accepts 
the call, he doesn’t know if Alice will reject the non-secure session and close the 
establishment. 
 
The solution to this problem is achieved by using the 1XX SIP responses, 
provisional responses, to carry the MIKEY response. If the 180 Ringing is 
used to carry the MIKEY response, the ringing delay could be big, since the 
callee should process all the crypto session.  The solution for that is to use a 
183 Session in Progress message, sent after the 180 Ringing but 
before the 200 OK [16]. 
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3. Background study conclusions 
After looking at the state of the art of several technologies linked to the area of 
this study, several conclusions in the different subjects covered can be 
proposed. 
 
3.1. Video conferencing 
Looking at the current video conference solutions, their problems and some 
solutions proposed in other studies and the lack of multicast capabilities of most 
networks, I conclude that a Multi-point Conference Unit is nowadays the best 
option for video conferencing over Internet. 
 
This system allows the users to send their media flows just once, but these are 
finally delivered to all other participants in the video conference. 
 
However, most of the commercial solutions are based in proprietary systems 
integrated in dedicated devices. Although most of them use standard protocols 
(such as H.323 and SIP), solve some security issues and can deal with High 
Definition media, they are closed solutions. 
 
Also, it is necessary to work in the video CODEC issue in order to minimize the 
delay introduced in the compression process. 
 
Finally, the need of a High Definition video conference system comes up to give 
the user the feeling he or she is in a real meeting with other participants. Adding 
other capabilities such as sharing files or digital shared blackboards could really 
make the difference in front of traditional video conference systems. 
 
3.2. Signalling protocol 
In this study I dealt with the signalling of a media session establishment, looking 
at the two main protocols used for that, H.323 and SIP. 
 
After my analysis, I come to the conclusion that because of its flexibility and its 
simplicity, SIP is the right protocol to use in the development of a new video 
conference environment. 
 
Moreover, SIP offers several options to secure the signalling messages and to 
perform user authentication, even though it is done using other protocols, and 
the possibility to establish a secure media session using SRTP and MIKEY. 
 
3.3. Security 
Several studies [18] show that using SRTP is the best option to secure a media 
session. This option does not add too much overhead and the security 
standards used on it are quite fast. Also, security is added at the application 
layer and can be platform-cross, since other options such as IPSec are usually 
linked to the operating system. 
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These reasons make me think that SRTP should be a very good solution for 
video conferencing, where minimizing the delays is one of the most important 
issues to solve. Also, thinking about High Definition or high quality media flows 
and their high bit rate, reducing the overhead is also important in order to save 
network bandwidth. 
 
SRTP needs an external mechanism to perform the key exchange, and 
previous studies at TSLab were focused on the use of MIKEY to do so. 
 
Since MIKEY is thought to be used over SIP and I stated that SIP is the best 
option for video conference signalling, I see no reason not to use also MIKEY 
as the exchange mechanism for SRTP master keys. 
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4. Implementation proposal 
After a theoretical study over different technologies that could be involved in a 
video conference solution and after stating which of them would fit better in this 
environment, I made a proposal on what I would like to implement. 
 
My idea consisted in building a secure MCU based on the i2cat RTP Packet 
Reflector and using miniSIP libraries to establish a secure media session. 
 
The RTP Packet reflector is a tool that receives RTP flows from all participants 
in a session and forwards one or all of these flows to all the participants. At that 
time, i2cat HDVIPER team was still working on some improvements of this 
software, in order to make it more flexible. 
 
The operation of this Packet Reflector is based on the decisions made by a 
meeting director, who would be able to switch the flows to be shown to 
participants in a meeting. My proposal was to create a mechanism to perform 
this actions using SIP. 
 
miniSIP is not only a SIP User Agent but a set of libraries that can be used to 
build new SIP applications. miniSIP also implements some of securing SIP 
measures, the MIKEY key agreement and can deal with SRTP media flows. 
 
Taking into account both software pieces, I proposed to create a SIP layer 
(using miniSIP libraries) to deal with all the signalling involved in the video 
conference set up, user joining and flow switching. This SIP layer should be 
able to communicate with the RTP Packet Reflector through a well-defined API 
(Figure 23), which was agreed with i2cat team, in order to make changes at the 
media level (switch the showed flow/s). 
 
 
Figure 23 MCU layer proposed design 
 
After finishing the signalling layer and its integration with the Packet Reflector, 
some changes were done in the RTP Packet reflector in order to add the 
possibility to work with SRTP flows (Figure 24). This drove me to add a MIKEY 
agreement using the miniSIP libraries and to add the parameters needed for it 
in the Packet Reflector. 
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Figure 24 SRTP capable MCU 
 
In order to control the flow switching by the director of the meeting, a signalling 
mechanism should be established (Figure 25). I proposed to use SIP, probably 
adding a new type of message to carry the flow switching commands. I finally 
discarded this feature, since the MCU implemented a forwarding-all-to-all 
behaviour (see 5, Implementation). 
 
 
Figure 25 Director Functionality 
 
In terms of measurements, I would like to measure the delay introduced in the 
Packet Reflector by forwarding the RTP packets as they come from their 
sources. This could be done using the RTP Packet reflector and some time 
measurement tools. 
 
After adding the SRTP functionality, I repeated the same measurements done 
in the RTP Packet Reflector with the secured software. Then I compared the 
results with the ones obtained in the non-secured software. 
 
Finally, I analyzed the obtained result in the secured scenario and determined if 
it was possible to use SRTP in a MCU based video conference, Trying to figure 
out how many participants can be handled by an MCU and which was the 
maximum flow bit rate they can send would be interesting too.  
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5. Implementation 
As stated in the implementation proposal (see 4), me and Erik Eliasson (my 
advisor) used miniSIP libraries to build a SIP layer for the Packet reflector, in 
order to create a media flow forwarding MCU. After that, we used one of the 
miniSIP libraries (libmikey) to perform a key exchange and set up SRTP 
sessions, securing the flows forwarded by the Packet Reflector. 
 
All the implementation was done using C++ language and tested under Ubuntu 
Linux 7.04. Since the libraries used to build the software are platform-cross, the 
result should be also platform-cross, although it hasn’t been tested in other 
platforms than Linux. 
 
5.1. SIP layer 
This element is the responsible of the establishment and control of the video 
conference through the MCU. It is SIP compliant, so any SIP client should be 
able to join a conference using this software. 
 
It works as a SIP server, receiving calls from the participants and adding them 
to the conference they ask to get in. It is also capable to perform a key 
exchange using the MIKEY protocol. The keys exchanged are used in the 
Packet Reflector to secure the media flows using SRTP. 
 
It has been created using miniSIP libraries, a tool developed mainly in KTH and 
as an OpenSource project. Specifically, libmutil, libmnetutil, libmcrypto, 
libmikey, libmsip and libminisip were used in the implementation of this 
application. 
 
5.1.1. Conferences 
First of all, the administrator should set up a conference in the service. At the 
moment, this can be done using the command line to create rooms. 
 
Once the room is created, the admin can decide which SIP-URIs are allowed to 
be in that conference. There are several possibilities to set up access policies: 
• Allow all SIP-URIs, using *. 
• Allow SIP-URIs just from one domain, using *@domain.com. 
• Allow only specific SIP-URIs, using user@domain.com. 
 
The command line interface accepts the next commands to manage the 
conferences running in the service: 
• room add [name] [description] : adds a new conference, 
identified by its name 
• room del [name] : deletes a conference 
• room allow [room_name] [SIP-URI] : allow SIP-URI(s) in the 
conference 
• room deny [room_name] [SIP-URI] : remove allowed SIP-URI(s) 
in the conference 
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• room list : lists the active conferences in the service 
• room list allowed [room_name] : lists the allowed SIP-URIs in 
the conference 
 
Finally, a default room is created by default and anybody can get in. This is 
done in order to allow SIP clients that don’t support tags in the URI to get in a 
conference. 
 
5.1.2. SIP calls 
As soon as the conferences are set up in the service, any of the SIP-URIs 
allowed to get in the conferences could call to the service. To do so, a room tag 
should be specified in the SIP-URI called. An example for that could be 
sip:mcu@minisip.org;room=testing. 
 
The service will check if the incoming call comes from a SIP-URI allowed to be 
in the room specified. If so, the call will be accepted in the required conference, 
and in case not, the call will be placed in the default room. 
 
5.1.3. SDP media dealing 
Since the MCU is going to deal with several SIP clients that will not be calling 
each other directly, some measures should be taken in order to make them 
agree which media to use. The main problem here is that the SIP client is not 
negotiating the media session with the final destination of the media, so some 
problems (such as incompatible types of media, media identifiers in RTP not in 
common) showed up. 
 
To solve this, when a call arrives to the MCU, the SDP offer carried in the SIP 
INVITE is analyzed by the MCU. 
 
If the user is the first one to get into he conference, all the rtpmap parameters 
on the SDP are stored (specially the RTP media type). When other users get in 
the conference, they must support at least all the media stored by the MCU and 
all the RTP media types should be the same. 
 
Operating this way is a simple solution to make sure everybody is available to 
deal with media that other participants will send, but also had a very important 
problem: only clients supporting the media supported by the first client to join 
the conference would be able to get in. 
 
An example for that would be the following: 
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Figure 26 SDP media dealing 
 
We chose this implementation for its simplicity, but it is one of the features that 
must be improved in future versions of the software. 
 
5.1.4. SIP State machine 
The implementation of the SIP layer performs the following state machine: 
 
 
Figure 27 Implemented SIP state machine 
 
When an incoming call arrives, the MCU checks if the user is authorized to be in 
the conference he is asking to participate in (see 5.1.1 Conferences). It also 
checks if the user is ready to deal with all types of media in the conference. If 
one of these conditions is not fulfilled, the MCU rejects the call by a 4xx SIP 
message. 
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If the INVITE message carries a MIKEY message, the MCU computes the 
response and attaches it to the 200 OK response. Then the user is added to 
the conference he asked to participate in (or to the default one) and the MCU 
goes to the state in_conference. 
 
If the INVITE message is not carrying a MIKEY message, the MCU just adds 
the user to the conference and sends the 200 OK response. Finally, it goes to 
the in_conference state. 
 
When a user leaves the conference, the MCU receives the BYE message, 
responds with a 200 OK and deletes the user from the conference. Finally, the 
call is terminated as going to the terminated state. However, the MCU can also 
terminate one call: it sends a 200 OK, goes to the wait_for_BYE state, waits for 
the 200 OK, remove the user from the conference and go to the terminated 
state. 
 
5.1.5. Key exchange: MIKEY 
In order to use SRTP to protect the media, each client has to exchange a key 
with the MCU, using the MIKEY protocol. Therefore, if the user requires the 
conference to be secure, a MIKEY capable SIP client must be used. 
 
In this implementation, only the Pre-shared Key method is implemented. It is 
quite simple, but the security level is enough to protect media flows in a video 
conference environment. 
 
During the implementation, we solved some issues related to the parameters 
used to derive keys appeared during the process. As stated in the background 
study of the MIKEY protocol (2.4.4 Key Agreement: MIKEY), MIKEY exchanges 
a Transport Generation Key (TGK). From this key, several Transport Encryption 
Keys (TEKs) could be derived, using the Crypto Session identifier (sent in the 
MIKEY exchange process) as the deriving index (see Figure 18). 
 
Again, it is possible to derive several sets of keys (encryption key, 
authentication key and salt key) to be used in the SRTP from a TEK, using the 
SSRC as the deriving index (see Figure 18). 
 
For every RTP flow to be secured, a crypto session with its identifier is going to 
be created and exchanged in MIKEY. The problem appeared when the MCU 
sent a flow with an SSRC that was not signalled in the MIKEY key exchange 
process, since the destination is not aware of that SSRC. 
 
Our solution was to wait for the first RTP packet of each SSRC to generate the 
SRTP keys. We read the SSRC from this first packet (the RTP headers are not 
encrypted) and then the MCU is able to derive the keys to use in that flow from 
the TEK generated for that call. 
 
The same happened when forwarding a new flow to one of the participants. 
Since the SSRC was not announced in the MIKEY exchange, the participant 
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does not know about it. The MCU will use the TEK generated for this call and is 
going to generate the SRTP keys using the newly appeared SSRC. 
 
Finally, the client will read the SSRC in the first packet of the SRTP flow, will 
generate the new keys and will decrypt and authenticate the flow. We also 
needed to change that in the miniSIP client. 
 
 
Figure 28 Dynamic SRTP key generation 
 
Re-Keying feature 
In the theoretical study of the SRTP is stated that a re-keying mechanism is 
needed if more than 248 packets are encrypted with the same key. Although 
MIKEY is capable to do that, we realised this feature is not needed in our MCU. 
 
We made some calculations in different cases to demonstrate that the re-keying 
feature is not needed. We calculate how much time would take to send 248 
packets with some well-known bandwidth rates of some media generators. 
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• SMTPE 292M over IP (UltraGrid) ~ 1,5Gbps (187,5Mbytes/s) 
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Even if we consider using the same key for the flow sent and the flow received 
(the time would be the half), we realise that the re-keying feature is not needed 
at all. Moreover, a possible attacker should sniff all the traffic during 35 years in 
the worst case and then analyse this traffic in order to calculate the keys used 
to secure that information. 
 
5.2. Packet Reflector 
This piece of software was developed by the i2cat HDVIPER team. It is an RTP 
packet bouncer that is capable to forward several RTP media flow, each one to 
several destinations. 
 
This software is also written in C++, so it was easy to integrate in the new MCU 
application created with miniSIP libraries. 
 
5.2.1. Integration with the SIP Layer 
The packet reflector is compiled in the same binary file as the SIP Layer does, 
so the result of the application is just one executable file. 
 
In order to build a complete MCU, it is needed not only the establishment but 
also to deal with media. In this case, we are building a forwarding MCU, so we 
need to tell the Packet Reflector what and where to forward it. 
 
To do so, an API was defined with the i2cat team. With this API, we should be 
able to add or delete sources and destinations in the Packet Reflector. These 
sources and destinations are agreed between participants and the MCU using 
SIP and SDP. 
 
When the MCU receives a valid incoming call (that is allowed and supports the 
required media), the information related to the media flows (the type of media, 
the IP address and the port) is read and an SDP answer is sent. After that and 
taking into account the parameters agreed in the SDP negotiation, the flows are 
set up in the Packet Reflector. 
 
The basic API for the Packet Reflector has the following methods and 
parameters: 
• addSource(flowId, source IP, destination Port) : adds a 
media flow as a source  
• addDestination(sourceFlowId, flowId, destination IP, 
destination Port) : adds a destination where to forward one of the 
source flows 
• removeSource(flowId) : removes one of the created sources and all 
the destinations for it 
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• removeDestination(sourceFlowId, flowId) : removes a 
destination of one of the sources 
 
Using the same example used in SDP media dealing, the Packet Reflector 
would receive the next orders: 
 
 
Figure 29 Packet Reflector orders in a SDP negotiation 
 
After that, the MCU will forward the media flows as shown in Figure 30. 
 
 
Figure 30 Flow result 
 
The addSource and addDestination methods are called when a user joins 
the conference (see room(add_user) in Figure 27). The SIP Layer reads the 
SDP information and sets up the flows in the Packet Reflector using that 
information. 
 
Finally, the removeSource and removeDestination methods are called 
when a user leaves the conference (see room(del_user) in Figure 27). The 
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SIP Layer keeps track of the flows assigned to a certain user, so when it leaves, 
these flows are deleted in the Packet Reflector. 
 
5.2.2. Securing media flows: SRTP 
In order to add security to the media flows forwarded by the MCU, we will use 
the SRTP protocol. 
 
Since the users are establishing the session with the MCU but the real 
destination of their flows is not the MCU, we need it to decrypt and re-encrypt all 
the secured media flows. 
 
The keys will be generated as explained in 5.1.5 (Key exchange: MIKEY) and 
the operation will work as shown in Figure 31. 
 
 
Figure 31 MCU operating with SRTP flows 
 
In order to generate the right keys for each user, we added new methods to 
create secured flows in the Packet Reflector. These methods just added a link 
with the MIKEY information exchanged with the user, so the right TEK can be 
used to generate the SRTP keys. The new methods added are the following 
ones: 
 
• addSource(flowId, source IP, destination Port, MIKEY 
info) : adds a media flow as a source, telling the Packet Reflector that 
all packets from this source should be decrypted and authenticated using 
the given MIKEY information 
• addDestination(sourceFlowId, flowId, destination IP, 
destination Port, MIKEY info) : adds a destination where to 
forward one of the source flows, telling the Packet Reflector that all 
packets sent to this destination should be encrypted and authenticated 
using the given MIKEY information 
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5.3. Alternative implementation 
We had several other ideas to solve the problems shown up during the design 
and implementation process. Although we did not implement them, they should 
be taken into consideration for future improvements on the software. 
 
5.3.1. Calling process 
At the beginning of the design process, we considered two options for the MCU 
operation: 
• Make the MCU to act as a server, so users could call to get into a 
conference. 
 
 
Figure 32 MCU as a server 
 
• Create a mechanism to make the MCU to call the participants in a 
conference, so they just have to answer the call to be in a conference 
scheduled at a certain time. 
 
 
Figure 33 MCU as a caller 
 
Both ideas were right, but we preferred the first one, since we wish the user to 
require being in a conference. Moreover, in the second option we would have to 
build a mechanism to schedule the MCU to call to certain users at a certain 
time, although it could also have been good for resource planning purposes. 
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However, would be nice to mix both in future versions. This would allow the 
system to invite new participants during a conference. 
 
5.3.2. Configuring rooms 
In this first implementation, we chose a command line system to add and 
configure conferences in the MCU, as explained in 5.1.1 (Conferences). We 
implemented this because it was very simple and we did not need something 
more complex at that time. 
 
A very good improvement for this system would be to create a web interface in 
order to allow the administrator to manage conferences. From this interface, it 
would be possible to add or delete rooms, allow or deny users and define 
schedules for the conference, so the resources could be booked. The best 
advantage of this option is that just a browser would be needed to manage the 
MCU. 
 
We did not look much into this feature, but we thought that a good system 
would be to use a database system to store data and a small daemon reading 
it, as done in ComCloser [4]. For this purpose, SQLite [25] seems to fit perfectly, 
since only a single file is needed and there is a small driver implemented in C++ 
that offers the possibility to push an alarm when content is modified. 
 
5.3.3. Signalling the conference 
In order to signal to the MCU to which conference the user wants to get in, our 
first thought was to use a different SIP URI for each room. 
 
Our idea was to make the MCU to register as a new SIP URI against the 
Registrar for each room created in the system. Then, the users just had to call 
to a simple SIP URI, such as room_name@domain.com. 
 
We discarded this idea because it was needed for the MCU to register the same 
contact info for several SIP URIs. We believed that using SIP parameters in the 
SIP URI was a better solution for this problem. 
 
5.3.4. Media parameters negotiation 
In 5.1.3 (SDP media dealing), it is explained the problem appeared when 
dealing with the media session negotiation in a conference using an MCU. 
 
We thought about different possibilities, a part of the chosen one, to solve this 
issue: 
• Check just the media name and save the media type identifier. After that, 
modify the forwarded packets with the media type negotiated with the 
destination. We discarded this idea because it was not the most efficient 
one since media packet should be analyzed and modified on the fly. 
• Find the common CODECs between the MCU and a new participant. If 
there is any common CODEC, accept the call but delete from the 
accepted media list the CODECs that this new user does not support. 
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The problem of this solution is that we needed to update the former users 
in the conference about the changes. 
 
We finally chose to require the new calls to accept, at least, all the media in the 
room in order to simplify this process. 
 
5.3.5. Announcing new participants 
In our implementation, when a client joins a conference, it is not announced to 
the former participants. The MCU starts forwarding the RTP flows and the 
clients just show or play them. This requires the clients to be capable to receive 
multiple RTP streams in the same port, but keeps simple the signalling plane. 
 
However, some previous research had been done in this area. In [21], it is 
proposed to announce the entrance of a new participant in a conference by a 
re-invite message to all the former participants. They suggest announcing the 
flows from the new participant as a hold media line offer (using 0.0.0.0 as IP 
and 0 as port). Then, the client should answer with an SDP announcing where 
and how (IP, port and RTP media type) it wants to receive these new flows (see 
Figure 34). 
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Figure 34 MCU re-Inviting operation 
 
Another possibility related to this option would be to use the SDP media 
attributes sendonly and/or recvonly (a=sendonly, a=recvonly), as proposed in 
[22]. 
 
On one hand, sendonly defines a media flow that the announcer wants to send, 
but not to receive it. On the other hand, recvonly defines a flow the announcer 
just want to receive, not to send. Back to the example in Figure 34, if these 
attributes were used, the negotiation would follow as shown in Figure 35. 
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Figure 35 MCU re-Inviting operation with sendonly attributes 
 
Despite these options, receiving multiple streams in the same port make 
everything easy when dealing with NAT traversal features. Also, it requires for 
the clients to understand these attributes, which is something not always 
happens.  
5.3.6. SRTP key generation for new flows 
We modified miniSIP in order to be capable to create new SRTP keys for a RTP 
flow that was not announced in the MIKEY negotiation. However, we thought 
about another possibility to solve the same problem. 
 
Instead of changing the client, we could make the MCU to re-invite the client 
when starting sending a new SRTP flow (see 5.3.5, Announcing new 
participants). Doing this, the MCU would send a new MIKEY message 
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announcing to the user the new SSRC, so it could create the keys to decrypt 
the new secured flow. 
 
Nevertheless, we thought the solution we chose to be simplest, although this 
could be a problem with other MIKEY capable SIP phones. 
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6. Tests and Measurements 
Once we finished the software implementation, we wanted to test its efficiency 
and figure up how many media flows and how much bandwidth it can deal with. 
We also wanted to realise the processing time difference when using SRTP. 
 
To do so, we needed a source with an output near to 25Mbps, but we did not 
have any equipment doing that. We solved this problem modifying miniSIP in 
order to generate byte streams at a certain bit rate to be sent as RTP payloads. 
 
We modified miniSIP to send 2000 RTP packets/second of 1420 bytes of RTP 
payload each one. The result of this modification was a 22,72Mbps RTP flow, 
which was very convenient for these tests since it is very similar to HDV video 
(~25Mbps). 
 
Finally we changed the configuration of the audio devices in miniSIP, to make it 
read/write to a file instead of the soundcard. The input file was a sequence of 0s 
and the output one was just an empty and writable file. 
 
6.1. Testbed 
After that, we set up the testing environment as shown in Figure 36. 
 
 
Figure 36 Testbed topology 
 
In this topology, the MCU runs in Laptop 1 and miniSIP client in all the other 
computers. From all the clients, a call is made to the same conference room in 
the MCU. As explained before, the result of this will be the one shown in Figure 
37. 
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Figure 37 Flow result 
 
6.2. Measuring tools 
Finally, and before starting the time tests, we needed to add some timestamps 
in the MCU software. To do so, we used a tool provided by libmutil, one of the 
libraries in miniSIP, called Timestamp. 
 
In every miniSIP based application, a global Timestamp object called ts exists. 
The tool used provides two methods that can be used to measure delays 
between instructions in the code: 
 
• save(string name): adds a timestamp with the text specified. 
• print(string filename): save the timestamps to the specified file. 
 
To use this tool, we just need to add the following line of code where we want to 
set a timestamp: 
 
ts.save(“name”); 
 
This instruction will generate a new timestamp with the following information: 
 
name:  absolute_time time_since_absolute_timestamp time_since_previous_timestamp 
 
The absolute time is the UNIX time in seconds. The time since the absolute 
timestamp and the time since the previous timestamp are expressed in 
microseconds (µs). 
 
6.3. Measurements 
In our application, we added several save lines to measure the time it takes to 
execute the following instructions: 
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• Time to read a RTP packet from an UDP socket (from “Receiving 
packet…” to “Packet received!”). 
• If the packet is encrypted, time to decrypt, authenticate and check the 
reply protection (from “Unprotecting packet…” to “Packet unprotected!”). 
• If the packet has to be sent as a SRTP packet, time needed to encrypt 
and authenticate it (from “Protecting packet…” to “Packet protected!”). 
• Time needed to sent the full (S)RTP packet via an UDP socket (from 
“Sending packet” to “Packet sent!”). 
 
6.4. Measurement results 
After running the tests using the new software, we got the results detailed in the 
following lines. 
 
6.4.1. Unsecured flows 
We started measuring delays in an unsecured environment. We configured 
miniSIP not to require the call to be secure, so the generated flows were not 
encrypted. A sample of the results of the time measurements could be the 
following one: 
 
Receiving packet...: 1213102654: 980448  101 
Packet received!: 1213102654: 980451  3 
Sending packet...: 1213102654: 980461  10 
Packet sent!:  1213102654: 980503  42 
Receiving packet...: 1213102654: 980579  76 
Packet received!: 1213102654: 980582  3 
Sending packet...: 1213102654: 980593  11 
Packet sent!:  1213102654: 980630  37 
Receiving packet...: 1213102654: 980704  74 
Packet received!: 1213102654: 980707  3 
Sending packet...: 1213102654: 980717  10 
Packet sent!:  1213102654: 980801  84 
Receiving packet...: 1213102654: 980850  49 
Packet received!: 1213102654: 980854  4 
Sending packet...: 1213102654: 980864  10 
Packet sent!:  1213102654: 980883  19 
Receiving packet...: 1213102654: 980983  100 
Packet received!: 1213102654: 980986  3 
Sending packet...: 1213102654: 980999  13 
Packet sent!:  1213102654: 981062  63 
 
As can be seen in the sample, for each packet the MCU receives, it is 
forwarded to the other participant in the conference. This is exactly the 
behaviour expected in the environment we set up. 
 
Looking at the results, we can make some calculations in order to figure up how 
much bandwidth the MCU can deal with. 
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• Average delay introduced in each packet 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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• Maximum theoretical throughput 
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Once we calculate the theoretical throughput, if we define a certain bandwidth 
to be sent from each user, it is easy to find how many users can be supported 
by the MCU. If we assume each user is just sending 22,72Mbps, we can find 
the number of users supported by our MCU in this scenario: 
 
( )
usersNN
user
Mbps
Mbps
usersflows
4
72,22
63,360
;
72,22
63,360
##
2
2
≈==
=
 
 
Unfortunately, and due to the lack of computers with a 1Gbps Ethernet 
interface, we could not verify neither if these calculations were right nor if these 
values were the same with more users in the system. 
 
6.4.2. SRTP secured flows 
After taking measures in the unsecured environment, we switched on security 
on all miniSIP clients in order to secure sent media flows. We got the flow 
schema shown in Figure 38. 
 
 
Figure 38 Flow result in a secure scenario 
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A sample of the time measurement results obtained in this scenario would be 
the following one: 
Receiving packet...: 1213102908: 447898  6 
Packet received!: 1213102908: 447906  8 
Unprotecting packet...: 1213102908: 447914  8 
Packet unprotected!: 1213102908: 447963  49 
Protecting packet...: 1213102908: 447968  5 
Packet protected!: 1213102908: 448041  73 
Sending packet...: 1213102908: 448043  2 
Packet sent!:  1213102908: 448055  12 
Receiving packet...: 1213102908: 448101  46 
Packet received!: 1213102908: 448105  4 
Unprotecting packet...: 1213102908: 448113  8 
Packet unprotected!: 1213102908: 448163  50 
Protecting packet...: 1213102908: 448167  4 
Packet protected!: 1213102908: 448236  69 
Sending packet...: 1213102908: 448237  1 
Packet sent!:  1213102908: 448250  13 
Receiving packet...: 1213102908: 448256  6 
Packet received!: 1213102908: 448260  4 
Unprotecting packet...: 1213102908: 448268  8 
Packet unprotected!: 1213102908: 448318  50 
Protecting packet...: 1213102908: 448322  4 
Packet protected!: 1213102908: 448371  49 
Sending packet...: 1213102908: 448395  24 
Packet sent!:  1213102908: 448445  50 
 
If we just look at the times of the protection and unprotection process of the 
packets, it is possible to calculate the average time to unprotect or protect a 
SRTP packet: 
 
st protectunprotect µ5,323
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+
=  
 
If we use now the forwarding time obtained in the unsecured scenario, we can 
calculate the theoretical throughput of the system running with SRTP flows and 
the maximum number of supported users, defining that each user just sends 
22.72Mbps: 
 
Mbps
byte
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packet
bytes
ss
packetBW 55,177
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1
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=
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≈==  
 
6.4.3. Alternative measurements with unsecured flows 
We also had the chance to make some tests in a more suitable scenario (shown 
in Figure 39). Due to some problems related to the implementation in the lasts 
versions of the Packet Reflector, it did not work properly in a multi-core 
computer. 
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Figure 39 Alternative testbed 
 
Anyway, we used an old and inefficient version of the Packet Reflect that 
worked in multi-core machines to take more measurements. A sample of these 
would be the following one: 
 
Receiving packet... : 1212654951: 818979  15 
Packet received! : 1212654951: 818984  5 
Sending packet... : 1212654951: 818997  13 
Packet sent!  : 1212654951: 819012  15 
Sending packet... : 1212654951: 819018  6 
Packet sent!  : 1212654951: 819026  8 
Receiving packet... : 1212654951: 819041  15 
Packet received! : 1212654951: 819045  4 
Sending packet... : 1212654951: 819059  14 
Packet sent!  : 1212654951: 819067  8 
Sending packet... : 1212654951: 819073  6 
Packet sent!  : 1212654951: 819087  14 
Receiving packet... : 1212654951: 819102  15 
Packet received! : 1212654951: 819106  4 
Sending packet... : 1212654951: 819120  14 
Packet sent!  : 1212654951: 819129  9 
Sending packet... : 1212654951: 819134  5 
Packet sent!  : 1212654951: 819143  9 
 
As can be seen in the sample, for each packet the MCU receives, it is 
forwarded to the other 2 participants in the conference. This is exactly the 
behaviour expected in the environment we set up (shown in Figure 40). 
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Figure 40 Flow result 
 
Looking at the results, we can make some calculations in order to figure up how 
much bandwidth the MCU can deal with in this situation. 
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• Maximum theoretical throughput 
Mbps
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bits
packet
bytes
s
packetBW 67,463
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Once we calculate the theoretical throughput, and defining a certain bandwidth 
to be sent from each user, it is easy to find how many users can be supported 
by the MCU. If we assume each user is just sending 22,72Mbps again, we can 
find the number of users supported by our MCU in this scenario: 
 
usersNN
user
Mbps
Mbps 5
72,22
67,463
;
72,22
67,463 2
≈==  
 
Unfortunately, and due to the lack of computers with a 1Gbps Ethernet 
interface, we could not check if these calculations were right or if we could add 
more users to the conference. 
 
We could neither test this scenario with secured flows, since the design of the 
old version of the Packet Reflector was not ready to add the parameters needed 
for it. However, we could make some theoretical calculations based on the 
measurements took in 6.4.2 (SRTP secured flows). 
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We applied the average time to unsecure or secure a packet and other times 
obtained in 6.4.2 (SRTP secured flows) to this scenario, so we obtained the 
average time to deal with a packet: 
 
st packet µ575,245,32 =+=  
 
With this time is easy now to calculate the theoretical maximum throughput and 
the number of users the system can handle: 
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Taking into account these calculations were just theoretical and that we mixed 
times obtained using either a good computer but bad software or better 
software and a slow computer, we feel that the use of security has an affordable 
cost in terms of computing time, unless a weak computer is used as the MCU. 
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7. Final conclusions 
This chapter of conclusions will focus on the signalling layer and security issues 
of my implementation, since they were the main targets of this study. 
 
During the early stages of the design and the implementation of the MCU we 
took some decisions that now do not seem to have been the best ones. I will try 
to explain our vision in the next paragraphs. 
 
In our implementation, we assumed that the SIP client was able to receive 
several RTP streams in the same UDP port. Our decision was done thinking 
about miniSIP, which can do that, but later tests showed that most other SIP 
clients (such as Ekiga or hardware SIP phones) can not do that. This is a 
problem for our software, since these clients will be able to play only one of the 
flows received and the user will be able to communicate just with one of the 
participants in the conference. 
 
The announcement of new participants joining the conference is linked to the 
multiple streams issue. In our implementation, the MCU does not inform the 
former participants that a new user joined the conference, it just starts 
forwarding the flows coming from this new user to the other ones. As explained 
in 5.3.5 (Announcing new participants), using re-invite messages and 
announcing new media flows in the SDP with the sendonly attribute seems to 
be the optimal solution to solve this problem, since the SIP clients would not 
need to support multiple streams in the same port. Also, we avoid the problem 
of ensuring everyone in a conference can receive all types of media sent (5.1.3, 
SDP media dealing), since the clients would reject all re-invites with SDP offers 
including unsupported media types. 
 
Moreover, thinking about MIKEY integration in this last solution, MIKEY 
messages could be sent in every re-invite, so the new RTP SSRCs would be 
announced in the SDP. By this way, SRTP keys could be generated before any 
media is sent and we would not need to modify miniSIP to read the SSRC from 
the first received packet. 
 
Despite all these issues appeared during the development of this thesis, we 
built a working system. All the knowledge acquired will be used for further 
implementations within the HDVIPER project, taking into account these 
conclusions. 
 
If the test results are analyzed, one could think that the MCU could be a 
limitation in terms of bandwidth. That is probably true, but the lack of multicast 
in most of the public networks drove us to choose this system. The good point 
about this is that it can also be used in a multicast environment to allow non-
multicast capable users to join a conference (see Figure 41). Furthermore, in 
this situation the MCU could also act as the central signalling point needed in 
multicast conferences. 
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Figure 41 MCU in a multicast network 
 
Also, we showed that using a forwarding MCU is convenient for 
videoconferencing, since the delay introduced by this element is very short. 
Although we didn’t implement them, we found some solutions to solve the 
problems appeared with the signalling of different types of media. 
 
We also discovered that the weakness of this system is not in the software itself 
but in the bandwidth available in the computer running the MCU. We made 
some calculations to prove that the maximum number of users the system can 
handle by a 1Gbps full duplex Ethernet is 7 users: 
 
MbpsMbpsMbpsBW
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Finally, although we only could test the new software with two users and a slow 
computer due to the problems in the Packet Reflector, we proved that using 
SRTP to secure media flows can be used to protect high bandwidth flows when 
using an MCU, since the delay added by this feature was short enough for 
videoconferencing. Moreover, if we think using a powerful computer to run the 
MCU or even using AES hardware en/decrypters, the delay would be shorter, 
more users could be supported and the performance could be better than in our 
tests. 
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9. Appendix A – miniSIP 
miniSIP is an Open-Source SIP User Agent (also known as SIP phone or 
Internet Phone) oriented to provide security to the calls done over Internet. 
 
It is designed in different code modules, called libraries, that join together to 
build a complete SIP phone. These libraries can be used separately to create 
new applications and that is what we did to develop the MCU. 
 
More information can be found on the miniSIP project webpage [23]. 
 
9.1. miniSIP libraries used by the MCU 
In order to make the new MCU application works, we used the following miniSIP 
libraries. All of them need to be compiled to use the MCU. 
 
• libmutil: cross platform support for threads, semaphores, mutex and 
other utilities. Used by all the other libraries. 
• libmnetutil: cross platform support for threads and networking utilities. 
Used by libmsip and libminisip. 
• libmcrypto: cross platform support for security utilities, such as AES 
encryption/decryption or SmartCard based authentication. Used by 
libminisip. 
• libmstun: support for NAT traversal using a STUN server. Used by 
libminisip. 
• libmikey: support for MIKEY protocol. Used by libminisip. 
• libmsip: full state SIP stack and utilities to create simple SIP 
applications. Used by libminisip. 
• libminisip: full SIP phone without a GUI. 
 
In the development of the MCU, we used directly tools from libmutil, libmikey, 
libmsip and libminisip. However, all the other libraries are needed for the right 
behaviour of the mentioned ones. 
9.2. Getting miniSIP 
miniSIP uses Subversion (also known as SVN) [24] as a version control and 
repository system, so to get the latest version of the code a SVN client is 
needed. 
 
In Linux, we can use the terminal SVN client to get it: 
 
svn co svn://svn.minisip.org/minisip/trunk 
 
Once it finishes downloading it, the source code of the latest version of miniSIP 
will be in the local computer. 
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9.3. Compiling miniSIP 
Once we obtained the source code via SVN, we need to compile the libraries to 
use them in the MCU. To do so, the following compiling tools are needed: 
• g++ 
• make, automake and autoconf 
• libtool 
 
A part of that, miniSIP has some dependency on other packages that must be 
solved before installing it: 
 
• libglademm and libgtkmm, used in the GTK GUI. 
• libssl-dev and openssl, used for security. 
• libltdl-dev, used for the plugin system. 
 
Before starting compiling, some settings must be written in the .bashrc file of the 
user. To do so, open the /home/user/.bashrc file and add the following lines at 
the end: 
 
export ACLOCAL_FLAGS="-I /home/user/share/aclocal" 
export LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/home/user/lib 
export CPPFLAGS=-I/home/user/include 
export LDFLAGS=-L/home/user/lib 
export PKG_CONFIG_PATH=/home/user/lib/pkgconfig/ 
 
After that, run the next command to update the changes: 
 
bash 
 
And create the following folders (use the mkdir command): 
 
• /home/user/share/aclocal 
• /home/user/lib/pkgconfig 
• /home/user/include 
• /home/user/bin 
 
Finally, the computer is ready to start compiling miniSIP libraries. Run the 
following commands in a terminal and wait for it to end: 
 
cd libmutil 
for i in libmutil libmnetutil libmcrypto libmstun libmikey libmsip libminisip 
minisip ; do cd ../$i; ./bootstrap && ./configure --enable-debug --disable-
gconf --enable-gtk --enable-textui --enable-video prefix=/home/$USER 
&& make && make install ; done 
 
By this command we configure and compile all the libraries needed by the MCU 
and the two GUIs (text based and GTK based) for the SIP phone. We enable 
the debug mode, the two GUIs and the video support, and we disable the 
configuration through the GConf configuring tool. 
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10. Appedix B – Using the new MCU application 
In order to use the new MCU application, it is first needed to compile the 
miniSIP libraries listed in 9.1 (miniSIP libraries used by the MCU). To do so, 
follow the instructions in 9.3 (Compiling miniSIP). 
 
Once the miniSIP libraries are correctly compiled and installed, the following 
packages should be installed, since they are dependencies of the Packet 
Reflector: 
 
• libboost-devel 
• libboost-thread 
 
As soon as these packages are correctly installed, the system is ready to 
compile the MCU application. To do so, the Makefile provided with the software 
can be used, so it is just needed to run make in a terminal. 
 
Once it is compiled, it can be run by the following command: 
 
./bin/mcu –u [SIP URI] –p [SIP PORT] -i [network interface] 
 
This will run an instance of the software, using the SIP URI specified, listening 
on the SIP port specified and using the network interface specified. 
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11. Appendix C – Terms and abbreviations 
3GPP  3rd Generation Partnership Project 
ADSL  Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line 
AES  Advanced Encryption Standard 
CA  Certificate Authority 
DH  Diffie-Hellman 
DNS  Domain Name Server 
GSM  Groupe Spécial Mobile 
HMAC  keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code 
HTTP  Hyper-Text Transfer Protocol 
IETF  Internet Engineering Task Force 
IKE  Internet Key Exchange 
IP  Internet Protocol 
IPSec  Internet Protocol Security 
ISDN  Integrated Services Digital Network 
ISAKMP Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol 
ITU  International Telecommunication Union 
MAC  Message Authentication Code 
MCU  Multipoint Conference Unit 
MIKEY  Multimedia Internet Keying 
MPEG  Moving Pictures Experts Group 
MTU  Maximum Transfer Unit 
NASA  National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NAT  Network Address Translation 
NTP  Network Time Protocol 
NTSC  National Television System Committee 
PAL  Phase Alternating Line 
PCM  Pulse Code Modulation 
PDA  Personal Digital Assistant 
PKE  Public Key Encryption 
PKI  Public Key Infrastructure 
PSK  Pre-Shared Key 
PSTN  Public Switched Telephone Network 
RFC  Request for Comments 
RTCP  Real-time Transfer Control Protocol 
RTP  Real-time Transfer Protocol 
SCTP  Stream Control Transmission Protocol 
SDP  Session Description Protocol 
SHA-1  Security Hash Algorithm 1 
SMTP  Simple Mail Transfer Protocol 
SIP  Session Initiation Protocol 
SIP-URI Session Initiation Protocol Universal Resource Identifier 
SRTCP  Secure Real-time Transfer Control Protocol 
SRTP  Secure Real-time Transfer Protocol 
SVN  Subversion 
TCP  Transmission Control Protocol 
TEK  Transport Encryption Key 
TGK  Transport Generation Key 
TLS  Transport Layer Security 
UA  User Agent 
UAC  User Agent Client 
UAS  User Agent Server 
UDP  User Datagram Protocol 
UHF  Ultra High Frequency 
VoIP  Voice over Internet Protocol 
 
